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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.  
 
 Earl Vanterpool was prosecuted and convicted under 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 706(1) (“Section 706”) for obsessive 
phone calls and faxes to his ex-girlfriend, Jacqueline Webster.  
On appeal, we are asked to consider three issues: (1) whether 
Section 706 is unconstitutional under the First Amendment; 
(2) whether Vanterpool has shown that his trial counsel’s 
performance amounted to an ineffective assistance of counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment; and (3) whether there was 
sufficient evidence in the record to support Vanterpool’s 
multiple convictions. 
 While we find that the First Amendment challenge 
would have been viable had it been raised during trial, the 
plain error standard that we are obligated to apply in this case 
precludes any grant of the relief sought.  By virtue of trial 
counsel’s failure to preserve the First Amendment challenge, 
however, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test is 
satisfied.  Because the record is insufficiently developed for 
us regarding whether trial counsel’s performance fell below 
professional norms, we shall remand and order that an 
evidentiary hearing be held to determine whether the 
performance of Vanterpool’s trial counsel did indeed fall 
below the Strickland standard.  
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In May 2004, Jacqueline Webster expressed a desire to 
end her relationship with Earl Vanterpool because Vanterpool 
had become possessive and called her frequently.  Despite 
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this issue, the two continued to be in contact with each other 
and did not officially end their relationship until November 
2004.  
 After the end of the relationship, Vanterpool continued 
to make numerous calls to Webster’s phone, and started 
sending her faxes. Vanterpool would, at times, call Webster 
as often as six or seven times an hour.  (App. 49, 52.)  
Webster informed Vanterpool that she wanted him to stop 
communicating with her, to no avail. 
 Following her unsuccessful attempts to stop 
Vanterpool’s communications, Webster went to the police 
station to file a report.  At the police station, Webster was 
assisted by Sergeant Boynes of the Virgin Islands Police 
Department.  While Webster was speaking with Boynes at the 
station, Vanterpool called her multiple times.  During one 
such call, Webster handed the phone to Sergeant Boynes, who 
informed Vanterpool that he was not supposed to be calling 
Webster and that if he continued to call her, he would be 
arrested.  Vanterpool continued to contact Webster through 
both phone and fax. 
 As a result of his behavior, the Government of the U.S. 
Virgin Islands (“Government”) brought four charges against 
Vanterpool: (1) one count of harassment by telephone 
occurring on or about January 6, 2005, in violation of V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 14, § 706(1) and V.I. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 
91(b)(10); (2) one count of harassment by telephone 
occurring on or about December 21, 2004, in violation of V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 14, § 706(1) and V.I. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 
91(b)(10); (3) one count of harassment by written 
communication occurring on or about January 6, 2006, in 
violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 706(1) and V.I. Code 
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Ann. tit. 16, § 91(b)(10); and (4) one count of harassment by 
written communication on or about December 21, 2004, in 
violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 706(1) and V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 16, § 91(b)(10).  
 Vanterpool and Webster both testified at the ensuing 
bench trial presided over by Judge Brenda Heller of the 
Superior Court of the Virgin Islands.  The Superior Court 
found Vanterpool guilty on all four counts; thereafter, 
Vanterpool filed a timely appeal.  The Appellate Division of 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands (“District Court”), in a 
per curiam opinion, affirmed Vanterpool’s convictions.  
Vanterpool filed this timely appeal.  
II. JURISDICTION  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under V.I. Code 
Ann. tit 4, § 33 and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c).   
III. ANALYSIS 
A. First Amendment Challenge   
 Vanterpool argues that Section 706 is unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States.  Section 706, in relevant parts, criminalizes the actions 
of anyone who “with intent to harass or alarm another person 
. . . communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, 
by telephone, or by telegraph, mail or any other form of 
written communication, in a manner likely to harass or 
alarm[.]”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 706(1).  It is uncontested 
that this constitutional challenge was not raised in the 
proceedings below, and therefore, the standard of review is 
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plain error.  See United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 
(2010).  Because this standard substantially limits the type of 
scrutiny that we may apply to Vanterpool’s First Amendment 
challenge, we now review the plain error standard in detail.   
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides a 
court of appeals with a limited power to correct errors that 
were forfeited because they were not timely raised in district 
court.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“Plain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were 
not brought to the attention of the court.”).  Under this 
standard, “an appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an 
error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates 
that (1) there is an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘clear or obvious, 
rather than subject to reasonable dispute’; (3) the error 
‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the 
ordinary case means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district 
court proceedings’; and (4) ‘the error seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’”  United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262. 
 The Supreme Court has elaborated upon the “clear or 
obvious” standard in the seminal case of United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993).  There, the Court 
clarified that a “court of appeals cannot correct an error 
pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current 
law.”  Id. at 734.  Applied to the present case, if the statute 
was unconstitutional, then the District Court would have 
committed error when it applied the statute; but even so, we 
could reverse only if the error were plain under current law. 
 While this Court has not expressly commented on this 
issue, our sister circuits have denied relief when an appellant 
has raised a constitutional challenge to a statute for the first 
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time on appeal.  See, e.g., United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d 
577, 592 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district court did not commit 
plain error in applying the Arkansas marriage statute even 
assuming that the statute is unconstitutional.”);  United States 
v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[E]rror is plain if 
it is clear or obvious under current law . . . [or] so egregious 
and obvious as to make the trial judge and prosecutor derelict 
in permitting it, despite the defendant’s failure to object.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Wright, 
466 F.2d 1256, 1259 (2d Cir. 1972) (“It is fair to say that the 
facial unconstitutionality of the wiretap statute does not leap 
from the pages of the United States Reports. The question is 
‘at least sufficiently close’ to take it out of the realm of plain 
error.”).  We find these cases to be persuasive.3  
 Here, even if the Virgin Islands statute is 
unconstitutional, it was far from being “clear under current 
law.”  See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.  From a review of reported 
cases, it appears that Section 706 had never been challenged 
before, let alone construed by a court at the time of 
                                              
3
 While there has been an instance where a court of appeals 
was satisfied that a constitutional challenge to a statute 
satisfied the plain error standard, see United States v. 
Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 950-52 (5th Cir. 1994), that case is 
easily distinguishable.  In that case, the Fifth Circuit issued 
United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993) 
while Knowles was being appealed.  Unlike the circumstances 
at issue here, the Supreme Court had expressly left this 
question open.  See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (“We need not 
consider the special case where the error was unclear at the 
time of trial but becomes clear on appeal because the 
applicable law has been clarified.”). 
 8 
 
Vanterpool’s trial.4  Therefore, the plain error review standard 
does not permit us to reach the constitutional challenge.
5
    
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim  
 Vanterpool argues that his trial lawyer’s performance 
fell below the standard of effective assistance in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States.   
 We first discuss whether we will review the ineffective 
assistance claim on direct appeal, given that this Court, in 
general, does not entertain a claim of ineffective assistance of 
                                              
4
 It appears that there had only been one reported case citing 
Section 706 at the time of the trial for the present case.  That 
case, however, did not construe the statute because the claim 
on the complaint relating to the statute was dismissed.  See 
James v. James, No. 1987/342, 1988 WL 142612 (D.V.I. 
Dec. 19, 1988). 
5
 We do not suggest that a constitutional challenge to a statute 
can never succeed on plain error review, but only that, in this 
instance, the unconstitutionality of the statute was 
insufficiently clear for us to strike it down under the plain 
error standard.  Cf. United States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110, 117 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“Neither the absence of circuit precedent nor 
the lack of consideration of the issue by another court 
prevents the clearly erroneous application of statutory law 
from being plain error.”) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  Also, it should be self-evident that nothing 
that we pronounce today forecloses future litigants from 
challenging the constitutionality of the statute.   
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counsel on direct appeal.  See, e.g., United States v. Givan, 
320 F.3d 452, 464 (3d Cir. 2003).  Among the reasons that 
such a claim is not usually cognizable on direct appeal is the 
very important fact that there will not, in the typical case, 
exist a record developed enough to assess the efficacy of 
defense counsel.  See United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 
132 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 Although we re-affirm this Court’s general practice, 
we find that the unique circumstances here warrant review on 
direct appeal.  Specifically, Vanterpool is unlikely to meet the 
“in custody” requirement to bring a collateral habeas petition 
pursuant to a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claim.
6
  The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the statutory language under § 2254 as 
requiring that the habeas petitioner be “in custody” under the 
conviction or sentence under “attack at the time his petition is 
filed.”  Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989) 
(emphasis added).  Here, Vanterpool is no longer “in 
custody” within the meaning of the habeas statute.  
Vanterpool was never incarcerated, as his sentence was 
suspended, and he presumably completed probation in 2008.  
Moreover, his restraining order was fully discharged when 
Vanterpool completed his probation.  The controlling Virgin 
Islands Code provides that “[t]he defendant’s liability for any 
fine or other punishment imposed as to which probation is 
granted, shall be fully discharged by the fulfillment of the 
terms and conditions of probation.”  5 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 
3711(a) (emphasis added).  Even if we construe an undated 
                                              
6
 We do not render an opinion on the availability of habeas, 
but discuss the issue here from a predictive standpoint as part 
of our reasoning as to whether to consider the ineffectiveness 
claim on direct review. 
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trial court restraining order as a permanent restraining order, 
such a “punishment imposed as to which probation is 
granted” was “fully discharged” when Vanterpool completed 
his three-year probation.
7
 
 This leaves remand as the prudential route.  It is worth 
noting here that our general aversion to entertaining a claim 
for ineffective assistance on direct appeal is to (1) benefit 
from the trial court’s fact finding; and (2) protect the 
defendant from prematurely bringing the claim, thereby 
sparing him from having res judicata attach to the ineffective 
assistance claim.  See United States v. Cooke, 110 F.3d 1288, 
1299 (7th Cir. 1997) (“This Court’s reluctance to consider 
ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal stems, of 
course, from the fact that such claims are very unlikely to find 
any factual support in the trial record and an adverse 
                                              
7
 Of course, the “in custody” language has not required that a 
petitioner be physically confined in order to challenge his 
sentence via a habeas corpus petition.  In Jones v. 
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 241-42 (1963), for example, the 
Supreme Court held that a prisoner who had been placed on 
parole was still “in custody” under his unexpired sentence.  
However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
custody requires a showing of “severe restraints on individual 
liberty,” which is unlikely to be found when the sentence 
imposed for the conviction has fully expired.  See Maleng v. 
Cook, 490 U.S. at 491 (“We have never held . . . that a habeas 
petitioner may be ‘in custody’ under a conviction when the 
sentence imposed for that conviction has fully expired at the 
time his petition is filed. Indeed, our decision in Carafas v. 
LaVallee, [391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)] strongly implies the 
contrary.”). 
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determination on direct appeal will be res judicata in any 
subsequent collateral attack.”). 
 Here, neither rationales apply: a trial court’s fact 
finding is only available on direct appeal, and there is no risk 
of res judicata applying since collateral relief is unavailable.  
Indeed, while this Court has not spoken much on this subject, 
other circuits have recognized that restrictions on the 
defendant’s ability to seek habeas relief constitute grounds to 
review ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Doe, 365 F.3d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(“AEDPA’s restrictions on a prisoner’s ability to seek more 
than one federal habeas petition presented ‘a significant 
reason’ not to dismiss ineffective assistance claims raised on 
direct review in favor of collateral attack under section 
2255.”).  The inability of Vanterpool to challenge his 
conviction on collateral attack is a matter of critical 
importance here.  If an ineffective assistance claim is 
unavailable both on direct appeal and collateral attack, we are 
essentially eviscerating a constitutional right by a way of 
tolerating instances where an individual would get convicted 
under a presumably unconstitutional state statute, leaving him 
with no recourse.   
 We emphasize that we are not abandoning our typical 
practice of eschewing consideration of ineffective assistance 
claims on direct appeal.  However, where, as here, a district 
court most probably would not have the opportunity to fact-
find on collateral attack, there is no principled reason to 
follow a discretionary procedure that we developed to ensure 
that factual records are developed before we review 
ineffective assistance claims.  Cf. United States v. Rashad, 
331 F.3d 908, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[W]e reject the 
Government’s premise that our remand practice on direct 
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appeal should be curtailed in order to give effect to the 
statutory restriction upon a defendant’s ability to launch a 
second collateral challenge to his conviction.”); United States 
v. Leone, 215 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e choose to 
exercise our discretion to remand to the district court for 
further fact-finding rather than to dismiss the appeal and force 
the appellant to use up his only habeas petition.”).   
 Therefore, we proceed to review the merits of 
Vanterpool’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
 1. Right to Counsel: Overview 
 The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the 
assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel playing a 
role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to 
produce just results.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 684-85 (1984).  The Supreme Court has set forth a two-
part test for evaluating the claim that he was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  First, 
“the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Id. at 688; 
see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).  This 
inquiry “is necessarily linked to the practice and expectations 
of the legal community.”  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 
366 (2010).  But a “fair assessment of attorney performance 
requires [us] . . . to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 Second, a defendant must prove prejudice.  The 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, “the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
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undermine confidence in the outcome.  That requires a 
“substantial,” not just “conceivable,” likelihood of a different 
result.  See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “This standard ‘is not a 
stringent one[.]’”  Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 
2001) (quoting Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 
1999)).  We examine the prejudice prong first, followed by 
the reasonableness prong.
8
   
 2. Prejudice  
 Of various theories offered by Vanterpool, the theory 
that ineffective assistance resulted from his counsel’s failure 
to “challenge the constitutionality of Section 706” deserves 
our scrutiny.
9
  (See Appellant Br. 28.) 
                                              
8
 This Court has “endorsed the practical suggestion in 
Strickland to consider the prejudice prong before examining 
the performance of counsel prong[.]”  United States v. Booth, 
432 F.3d 542, 546 (3d Cir. 2005). 
9
 Although we find that this theory is sufficient to 
demonstrate the prejudice prong, we also note that the record 
is replete with statements by trial counsel that raise questions 
about his competency.  (See, e.g., App. 134 (“I really don’t 
know what to say. Mr. Vanterpool says he wants to have a 
trial so we had a trial.”); App. 135 (“At this point there is no 
real rationality to it. . . . He just seems to be incapable of 
understanding that a person is telling him that they no longer 
want to have contact with him.”).) 
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 The First Amendment, applicable to the U.S. Virgin 
Islands through the Organic Act,
10
 states that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”  U.S. 
Const. amend. I.  Although the rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment are not absolute, as a general matter, the 
Government may not limit or prohibit speech.  See Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) (“As a 
general principle, the First Amendment bars the government 
from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear.”). 
 Vanterpool makes three constitutional challenges to 
Section 706 under the First Amendment.  First, Vanterpool 
argues that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied 
to him.  Second, Vanterpool argues that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague on its face.  Finally, he argues that 
the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad.  Of these 
challenges, we only need to analyze the overbreadth 
challenge to show that there would have been a reasonable 
probability that the outcome would have been different.      
 The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech 
forbid the states to punish the use of words or language not 
within “narrowly limited classes of speech . . . .”  Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).  Even as to 
such a class, however, because “the line between speech 
                                              
10
 “[T]he Organic Act guarantees to the inhabitants of the 
islands in the very language of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States the same freedom of speech 
and of the press which is safeguarded to the inhabitants of the 
United States by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”  
People of Virgin Islands v. Brodhurst, 148 F.2d 636, 643 (3d 
Cir. 1945). 
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unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may 
legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely 
drawn[,]” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958), “[i]n 
every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, 
in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the 
protected freedom,” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
304 (1940).  In other words, the statute must be carefully 
drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only 
unprotected speech and not be susceptible to application to 
protected expression.  Because First Amendment freedoms 
need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in 
the area only with narrow specificity.  Nat’l Ass’n for 
Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 
(1963).  To prevail upon such a challenge, especially in a case 
involving conduct as well as speech, the overbreadth of the 
statute “must not only be real, but substantial,” in relation to 
the legitimate coverage of the statute.  Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).   
 The Government points to our precedent in United 
States v. Lampley to uphold the constitutionality of Section 
706.  Lampley, which involved a person charged under the 
federal telephone harassment statute, 47 U.S.C. § 223, 
involved a “bizarre tale of a romantic obsession” involving a 
breakup and a launch of “a telephonic assault . . . unleashing a 
barrage of incessant and subsequently abusive telephone 
calls.”  United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 
1978).  Lampley asserted that the statute violated the First 
Amendment because it failed to specify that the requisite 
ensuing conversation must contain harassing language.  This 
Court rejected such a claim, reasoning that the statute’s 
specific intent requirement rendered unconvincing Lampley’s 
claim, since it has long been true that “[w]here the 
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punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with 
the purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the 
accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or 
knowledge that the act which he does is a violation of law.”  
Id. at 787 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-
02 (1945)).  
 A close examination of the statutory language of 
Section 706, along with the actual charges brought against 
Vanterpool reveals, however, that Lampley is distinguishable 
from this case.  Importantly, unlike the federal telephone 
harassment statute, the Virgin Islands statute seeks to regulate 
not only conduct associated with the use of the telephone, but 
also “written communications.”11  The Virgin Islands statute, 
moreover, regulates not only conduct “solely intending to 
harass” but any conduct “intending to harass,” broadly 
sweeping to regulate a wide variety of expressive speech.
12
  
                                              
11
 The record makes clear that Counts III and IV are charges 
for “writing in a manner likely to harass or alarm her.”  (App. 
38 (emphasis added).)   
12
 The version of the federal statute discussed in Lampley 
criminalized anyone who “makes repeated telephone calls, 
during which conversation ensues, solely to harass any person 
at the number called[.]”  Lampley, 573 F.2d at 791 (quoting 
47 U.S.C. § 223 (1)(D) (1976) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The Virgin Islands statute, on the other hand, 
criminalizes the actions of anyone who “with intent to harass 
or alarm another person . . . communicates with a person, 
anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, or by telegraph, 
mail or any other form of written communication, in a manner 
likely to harass or alarm[.]”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 706(1). 
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 Here, the record indicates that the letters sent by 
Vanterpool are forms of written communications that fall 
within the category of protected speech.  (See, e.g., App. 150 
(“I still love you and thanks.  I forgive you like the Lord 
forgive [sic.] us in order to make it into his Kingdom.”).)   
Vanterpool’s communications do not fall into one of the 
defined categories of unprotected speech such as defamation, 
incitement, obscenity, or child pornography.
13
  Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002).  Nor do they 
constitute unprotected “true threats,” because they are not 
“serious expression[s] of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003).  
Rather, they are the kind of communicative speech that 
implicates the First Amendment.  See Jed Rubenfeld, First 
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 770, 777 (2001).  
Indeed, Vanterpool’s faxed letters are at best communications 
people might find distasteful or discomforting.  While the 
Government has undoubtedly a legitimate interest in 
protecting persons against unwarranted invasion of privacy by 
others, see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the 
Supreme Court has also made very clear that such 
communications are fully protected speech.  See Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
                                              
13
 First Amendment protection applies as much to written 
materials sent through the mails, as it does to verbal 
communications.  See Lamont v. Postmaster General of the 
United States, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (stating that “the use 
of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the 
right to use our tongues”). 
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government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”). 
 Section 706 is especially repugnant to the First 
Amendment because past romantic relationships or family 
conflicts often lead to unsatisfactory, unpleasant discourse 
that still falls under the protection of the First Amendment.  
See United States v. Darsey, 342 F. Supp. 311, 314 (E.D. Pa. 
1972) (“Up to a point these are the normal risks of human 
intercourse, and are and should be below the cognizance of 
the law.”).  The State may not abridge one’s First 
Amendment freedoms merely to avoid annoyances.  Coates v. 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).  “The ability of 
government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off 
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other 
words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy 
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable 
manner.”  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).  
Moreover, the First Amendment protects more than just 
amiable communications.  See, e.g., Norwell v. City of 
Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14, 15-16 (1973).  A harassment statute 
should be carefully tailored to avoid constitutional 
vulnerability on the grounds that it needlessly penalizes free 
speech. 
 Therefore, had Vanterpool’s attorney raised the issue 
to the trial court, Section 706 would likely have been found 
unconstitutional.  By virtue of his trial counsel’s failure to 
preserve a viable First Amendment challenge, Vanterpool has 
satisfied the second prong of the Strickland test.   
 3. Trial Counsel’s Performance 
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 “[T]he proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms.”  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A fair assessment of counsel’s 
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate 
the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and evaluate 
the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.  See 
Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 105-06 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, 
a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 
action “might be considered sound trial strategy.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be 
evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the 
alleged error and in light of all the circumstances.  Id. at 689.  
In making the competency determination, the court “should 
keep in mind that counsel’s function, as elaborated in 
prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial 
testing process work in the particular case.”  Id. at 690.  
Because that testing process generally will not function 
properly unless defense counsel has done some investigation 
into the prosecution’s case and into various defense strategies, 
the Supreme Court has stated that “counsel has a duty to 
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”  
Id. at 691.     
 There are several competing factors at play here.  In 
favor of Vanterpool’s position, there were cases from other 
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jurisdictions at the time of the trial that found similar statutes 
unconstitutional.  See, e.g., United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 
672, 674-78 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the federal 
telephone harassment statute was unconstitutionally vague); 
Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 4 n.1 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding 
that the Virginia statute making it illegal to “curse or abuse 
anyone, or use vulgar, profane, threatening or indecent 
language over any telephone” was facially overbroad).  This 
fact is important because this Court has held that counsel’s 
failure to raise a personal-use argument at sentencing 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel based on 
precedents from our sister circuits.  See Jansen v. United 
States, 369 F.3d 237, 241, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2004) (“At the 
time of sentencing the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits had held that drugs possessed for personal use 
may not be included in calculating a Guideline sentence for 
possession with intent to distribute under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. . 
. . The conclusion that counsel’s performance was ineffective 
is not based on hindsight. The decisions [of our sister circuits] 
were readily available to him.”).  Thus, if trial counsel’s 
failure to raise a First Amendment challenge is attributable to 
an ignorance of the law, Vanterpool would have a valid 
ineffective assistance claim.  As the Supreme Court recently 
re-affirmed, “[a]n attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that 
is fundamental to his case combined with his failure to 
perform basic research on that point is a quintessential 
example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.”  
Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014). 
 Undermining Vanterpool’s claim, on the other hand, is 
our precedent in Lampley construing a similarly-worded (yet 
substantively different) federal statute.  United States v. 
Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978).  This case, along with 
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a number of cases from other jurisdictions upholding the 
constitutionality of similar statutes,
14
 could have suggested to 
reasonably competent trial counsel that a First Amendment 
challenge would be unsuccessful.  If Vanterpool’s counsel 
had considered the issue, and had determined from either a 
merits-based or strategic standpoint that the challenge to the 
statute should not be pursued, we might have greater 
difficulty in concluding that his representation was sub-
standard.  We cannot, however, determine this on the record 
provided to us given that the facts necessary for the 
consideration of this issue were not explored at trial and are in 
need of further development.  Therefore, because we find that 
there are not sufficient facts in this record for Vanterpool to 
meet the first prong, we find that remand is appropriate.  
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence  
 Vanterpool argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to permit the jury to find that Vanterpool’s conduct 
constituted a violation of Section 706.  Critical to his position 
is the argument that the government “failed to prove that 
Vanterpool had the requisite ‘intent to harass or alarm another 
person[.]’”  (Appellant Br. 47.)   
 This argument is unavailing.  Under Supreme Court 
precedent, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
                                              
14
 See, e.g., State v. Hagen, 558 P.2d 750, 752 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1976); see also Wayne F. Foster, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of State Criminal Statutes Forbidding Use of 
Telephone to Annoy or Harass, 95 A.L.R.3d 411 (1979) 
(collecting cases).  
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rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).  In reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence, “we must view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Government[.]”  United States 
v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 534 (3d Cir. 1978).  As this Court 
has pronounced, a district court’s verdict will be overturned 
“only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of 
how it is weighted, from which the jury could find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Miller, 527 
F.3d 54, 62 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Thayer, 
201 F.3d 214, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
 Here, there is enough evidence in this record to find 
that Vanterpool violated Section 706.  Vanterpool admitted in 
court that the repeated telephone calls were placed by him, 
and Vanterpool did not contest that these calls and letters 
were sent even after being told by the police and Webster that 
the communications were not welcome.  Because the 
reviewing court must treat all of the incriminating evidence as 
true and credible, the Government has presented sufficient 
evidence that Vanterpool violated the statute.  See United 
States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2005).  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate and 
remand this case for further proceedings in accord with this 
opinion.      
